

# **The Impact of Issues on the 2016 Presidential Election in Taiwan**

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The January 2016 presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan certainly produced a dramatic and unprecedented victory for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) over its long-time rival the Kuomintang (KMT). While Chen Shui-bian had captured the presidency in 2000 with 40% of the vote and in 2004 with 50%, in 2016 Tsai Ing-wen swept to victory with a decisive 56% majority over the KMT's Eric Chu (31%) and the People First Party (PFP)'s James Soong (12%). The DPP's victory in the Legislative Yuan represented even more impressive gains. The DPP had never had a parliamentary majority before 2016, either alone or in a coalition with smaller allied parties. In 2016, in dramatic contrast, it increased its number of seats from 40 in 2012 to 68 in the 113-member Legislative Yuan, as KMT membership collapsed from 64 to 35. One seeming contribution to the DPP triumph was that a substantial number of KMT voters, in particular those residing in China, stayed home, leading to a significant decline in the overall turnout rate from 74% in 2012 to 66% in 2016. Furthermore, while receiving lesser notice, the New Power Party (NPP) won 5 seats, marking the first electoral success in Taiwan politics of a "protest party" not associated with a defecting

faction or leader of one of the two major parties (Copper, 2016; Fell, 2016; Hsieh, 2016; Templeman, 2016; Wu, 2016).

The dramatic DPP victory suggested that fundamental change may have commenced in the nature of Taiwan politics, particularly in the partisan balance (Clark, Ho, and Tan, 2016; Hsieh, 2016; Templeman, 2016). Another area of possible change is the relationship between the issue position of Taiwan voters and their voting patterns. For most of the country's democratic history national identity has been the dominant issue in its politics (Clark and Tan, 2012; Fell, 2005, 2012; Hsieh, 2002, 2016). Two other issues may be becoming more salient, however. First, Taiwan's declining economic performance could have made economic issues more important; and, second, widespread alienation from political elites could have become a significant issue as well. This paper, then, explores how issues affected presidential vote in the 2016 elections. The first section provides an overview of the election; the second describes the research design; and the third reports our analysis.

## **Overview of the 2016 Presidential Election**

The decisive 2016 DPP victory had been building for four years. In January 2012, President Ma Ying-jeou won re-election by a margin of 52% to 46% over the DPP's Tsai Ing-wen. This was considerably less than his margin in 2008; and the KMT's majority in Legislative Yuan saw a similar reduction. Still, Taiwan's citizens had given Ma and the KMT a vote of confidence. It turned out to be an extremely short mandate, however. Within six months of his election, Ma's approval rating had plummeted to 15%, which broke Chen Shui-bian's record low of 18%; and his popularity never rose very significantly after that. This tumultuous drop reflected the confluence of several factors. First, Ma, as is common among many incumbent chief executives, put off several unpopular decisions until after he was safely re-elected. Second, there was a major corruption scandal. Third, Taiwan's economy slowed markedly from 4.2% growth in 2011 to 1.5% in 2012. Finally, Ma's troubles were compounded by growing strains within the Kuomintang which weakened his ability to pass items in his program through the legislature (Chen, 2013; Clark and Tan, 2016; Hsieh, 2014; Templeman, 2016).

Popular discontent with Ma and the KMT came to a head in the spring of 2014. The Ma administration sought to expand the free trade pacts with the PRC that had been negotiated in his first

term when it signed the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with Beijing in June 2013. This was a major proposal that included financial services, communications, health and social services, business services, transportation, tourism, environmental services, and distribution services. The Agreement immediately became highly controversial (Fan, 2014; Hsieh, 2014, 2015). No progress was made in considering it as the Ma administration showed no interest in compromise; and the DPP showed no interest in moving forward in the Legislative Yuan's consideration of the CSSTA. Then a volcano erupted in mid-March 2014 when the Joint Committee Review Meeting on the CSSTA in the Legislative Yuan ended in chaos. Lawmakers from the DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) seized the podium and prevented the KMT's Chang Ching-chung from presiding. Finally, Chang declared that the meeting was over and that the review period was complete, clearing the way for a vote on the trade pact and leading the DPP to protest vociferously. The next day, protests commenced outside the Legislative Yuan; and in the evening, students accompanied by some DPP legislators entered and occupied the Legislative Yuan, thereby setting off the Sunflower Movement. The Ma administration ignored the demands of the Sunflowers and indicated that the CSSTA should be approved as is, creating a stalemate. The occupation of the Legislative Yuan continue for five weeks until Speaker Wang agreed to develop and implement a

program for monitoring cross-Strait agreements before acting on the CSSTA. Due to partisan polarization, however, nothing happened on this. Public opinion polls in the spring of 2014 showed the Sunflower Movement to have extremely strong public support (Fan, 2014; Hsieh, 2015; Liu, 2014; Smith, 2015; Smith and Yu, 2014; Sui, 2015; Wang, 2014; Wei, Wang, and Hsu, 2014). In political terms, the Sunflower success made a major contribution, although certainly not the only one, to the fall of the KMT, which was trounced in the 2014 local elections (Copper, 2014; Hsieh, 2015).

There was only a little over a year from the November 2014 local elections and the January 2016 presidential and legislative elections. Little occurred that would have brightened the spirits of KMT members. Rather, the economy worsened, enhancing the problem of inequality and reinforcing public perceptions that the Ma administration cared little for the poor or the young whose bleak job prospects had led them to be called "Taiwan's lost generation." Furthermore, students appeared to be strongly opposed to ongoing attempts to mandate a more China-centric curriculum. Thus, the younger generation had added reasons to the repression of the Sunflower Movement as a reason to feel alienated from the Kuomintang (D. Chen, 2017; Copper, 2016; Gerber, 2016; Hickey and Niou, 2016; Wu, 2016).

Consequently, as the campaign commenced, the DPP appeared to be far better situated than their major party rival. The DPP nominated Tsai Ing-wen as their presidential candidate with no formal opposition and went into the campaign with a united party. Tsai was able, moreover, to negate the usual KMT advantage on the central issue of cross-Strait relations. In the past, those who want Unification with China supported the KMT; and those who favored Independence voted for the DPP. The tipping point, however, was the half or more of the electorate who wanted the ambiguous Status Quo to continue. These citizens on average saw the KMT's stated policy of "one China with different interpretations" by the ROC and PRC as supporting the status quo, in contrast to the DPP's total rejection of this so-called "1992 consensus" between China and Taiwan, a position that Beijing claimed was totally unacceptable. Tsai stated that she supported the status quo in cross-Strait relations and made no mention of the 1992 "consensus" that there was "one China" but that the ROC and PRC had different interpretations of what it was -- which was associated with Ma and the Kuomintang and which had been harshly criticized by the DPP. Disarray within the Kuomintang, furthermore, made this position look moderate. Presumably because they assumed that Tsai would win easily, none of the senior KMT officials who were expected to contend for the KMT presidential nomination entered the fray. Instead the Deputy

Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Hung Hsiu-chu, won without much opposition. Hung was a fierce critic of Taiwan Independence and stated that she believed in "One China, Same Interpretation" which was widely interpreted as support for Unification. Polls showed her to be quite unpopular; and the KMT's prospects looked ever more dismal when James Soong of the PFP announced that he would run. In October, the KMT dumped Hung as a candidate, which enraged her supporters, and replaced her with Eric Chu, the Party Chairman and Mayor of New Taipei City. Chu did little to revive popular support for the KMT, though (Copper, 2012; Hickey and Niou, 2016; Hsieh, 2015, 2016; Wu, 2016).

## **Research Design**

Our research design for estimating the impact of issues on presidential vote is based on the two-stage model in Figure 1. In the first stage, three issues are used to explain who voted for Tsai as opposed to Chu or Soong. In the second stage, seven demographic factors are added to the three issues to examine how they affect the relationship between issues and vote, as well as being used to explain why Taiwanese voters hold the issue positions that they express. The data are taken from *Taiwan's*



*2016 Election and Democratization Study* (TEDS, 2016). Binomial logistic regression is then applied to estimate the various effects in this model. All the variables used are dichotomies with the values of 0 and 1. There are multiple indicators of the three issues under consideration here (national identity, economic concerns, and alienation from political elites). For national identity and political alienation, the one with the strongest relationship with presidential vote was included in the analysis. There do appear to be two separate dimensions of economic stress, in contrast. Consequently, two indicators were used to represent this dimension.

**Figure 1 here**

All the variables and their codings are listed under the arrow diagram in Figure 1. For Presidential vote, Tsai (63%) is coded 1; and Chu and Soong are coded as 0 (37%). The indicator for national identity, what Taiwan's International Status should ultimately be has three categories: independence (31%), status quo (56%), and unification (13%). For the logistic regression equations, Independence (0 = No; 1 = Yes) and Unification (0 = No; 1 = Yes) are used as dummy variables, while Status Quo is the baseline. The two indicators of economic stress are the perception that Taiwan's economy had gotten worse in 2016 (0 = No; 1 = Yes), with 57% agreeing that it had, and the belief that inequality was severe (0 = No; 1 = Yes), with 61% agreeing that

it was. Finally, political alienation was measured by the perception that government decisions promote public welfare (0 = No; 1 = Yes), with which 47% agreed. Six of the demographic characteristics were divided into dichotomies: income (over and under 59,000 NT\$ per month); occupation (white collar and other); education (more or less than a junior high education) gender (male and female); age (under and over 40); and area (South versus North and East), with high income, white collar occupation, more education, female, older age, and South being coded 1. For father's ethnicity, we used the two categories of Min-nan Taiwanese and Mainlander to form dummy variables. In addition, when party identification is converted into a dichotomy between blue and green parties, it had an extremely strong association with presidential vote, as shown in Table 1: the Nagelkerke Pseudo  $R^2$  is .84; the Odds Ratio is 393; and the logistic regression classifies 95% of the voters' presidential choices correctly, in contrast to the 63% in the modal category of Tsai. Thus, we did not include party identification in the analysis.

**Table 1 here**

Table 2 lists the hypothesized relationships between voting for Tsai and the issue positions and demographic variables. We posit that Tsai would appeal to Taiwanese nationalism; so that Independence, South, and Min-nan Father should have a positive

relationship with Tsai Vote, while Unification and Mainlander Father should have a negative one. Tsai and the DPP should also appeal to the more marginalized members of Taiwan's society. Consequently, Economy Worse and Inequality Bad should be positively related to and Government Promotes Public Welfare, Income, Education, and White Collar Occupation should be negatively associated with supporting the DPP's presidential candidate. In addition, the KMT's alienation of younger voters (see previous section) indicates that age would be negatively associated with Tsai vote, while being female should have a positive association since Tsai was the only women in the race.

**Table 2 here**

## **Analysis**

Our analysis was developed in three stages. The first examined the bivariate association between issue position and presidential vote. The second adds the demographic characteristics to the explanatory equation in order to ascertain that the observed correlations between issues and supporting Tsai at the polls are not just the result of these control variables. Finally, the demographic factors are used to explain each of the five issue positions.

Table 3 presents the results for bivariate logistic regressions between Tsai vote and the five issue indicators. All are in the predicted directions (Independence, Economy Worse, and Inequality Bad positive; Unification and Government Promotes Public Welfare negative) and highly significant statistically (.0004 or less). Independence has by far the strongest correlation with a Psuedo  $R^2$  of .21, while the other four have Pseudo  $R^2$ s in the .05 (Economy Worse and Inequality Bad) to .07 (Unification and Government Helps Public Welfare). It is also instructive to examine the crosstabulation between Taiwan's ultimate political status and presidential vote in Table 4. As expected because of the large difference between their Pseudo  $R^2$ s, Tsai's margin among pro-Independence voters is considerably greater than the two Blue candidates advantage among pro-Independence citizens (88% to 11% versus 67% to 33%). Moreover, despite the Kuomintang's previous support by those who want the status quo (see previous section), Tsai actually carried this group 53%-47%.

#### **Tables 3 and 4 here**

The bivariate results are consistent with national identity's being the dominant issue in the 2016 election. However, when all five issue positions are included in a logistic regression explaining Tsai Vote in Table 5, political alienation and perceptions of economic problems retain their highly

significant impacts in the predicted direction (.006 for Inequality Bad and .0004 for the other four independent variables). The Adjusted Odds Ratios are 6.91 for Independence, 2.05 for Economy Worse, and 1.41 for Inequality Bad (the independent variables with positive associations with Tsai Vote) and .42 for Unification and .47 for Government Helps Public Welfare (the independent variables with negative associations). Furthermore, adding the three indicators of economic distress and political alienation to the equation raises the Psuedo  $R^2$  to .32 from .23 when just Independence and Unification are included in the logit. The classification analysis provides another insight into the 2016 voting dynamics. The regression equation predicts 72% of the votes correctly compared to 63% in the model category of Tsai vote. In addition, though, the impact of issues on vote was noticeably stronger for Tsai supporters (81%) than for those who cast their ballots for one of the Blue candidates (58%).

**Table 5 here**

The second stage in the analysis is to examine the effects of adding the demographic characteristics to the analysis. Table 6 reports the results from a binomial logistic regression including both the five issue positions and the eight demographic factors. The demographic factors clearly add to the explanatory power of the regression analysis. The Psuedo  $R^2$  rose to .39 from .32 when just the issues were included in the explanatory

equation; and the classification analysis predicted 76% (66% for the two Blue candidates and 82% for Tsai) of the votes correctly, up from 72% for the five issue positions.

**Table 6 here**

For this paper, the key finding is that controlling for the demographic characteristics of Taiwanese voters changes the impacts of the individual issues very little. All five relationships are statistically significant and in the predicted direction. The significance of Inequality Bad does rise to .035, but the other four independent variables are significant at the .001 level or less. Furthermore, their Adjusted Odds Ratios (AORs) are quite similar: 6.01 versus 6.91 for Independence; .48 versus .42 for Unification; 2.30 versus 2.05 for Economy Worse; 1.42 versus 1.41 for Inequality Bad; and .50 versus .47 for Government Helps Public Welfare. Overall, therefore, national identity continued to be the most important issue in the 2016 presidential election. However, both economic unhappiness and political alienation had quite significant effects as well.

Three demographic factors, Min-nan Father, Mainlander Father, and South (where native Taiwanese nationalism is most intense), are associated with ethnicity. Only one of them has a significant impact on Tsai vote. This is Mainlander Father which, as predicted, has a negative relationship with Tsai Vote:  $b = -1.20$ ;  $\text{Sig} = .0004$ ;  $\text{AOR} = .30$ . Similarly, there are three

indicators of socioeconomic status, Income, Occupation, and Education. Of these, only Education is significant, with the less educated being the most supportive of Tsai:  $b = -.73$ ;  $\text{Sig} = .001$ ;  $\text{AOR} = .48$ . The alienation of youth is also evident in these results as younger Taiwanese are clearly more supportive of Tsai than their elders:  $b = -.59$ ;  $\text{Sig} = .001$ ;  $\text{AOR} = .56$ .

The third stage of the analysis is to determine how demographic characteristics influence issue stances in Taiwan. Here, we made five hypotheses. First, that demographic traits would shape issue beliefs quite significantly ( $H_1$ ). Second, that the indicators of ethnicity would have a stronger impact on national identity than the measures of economic stress and political alienation do ( $H_2$ ). Third, that the reverse would be true for economic stress and political alienation ( $H_3$ ). Fourth, that younger age would be associated with more support for Independence and higher levels of both economic stress and political alienation ( $H_4$ ). Finally, that gender, especially since it does not have a statistically significant relationship with presidential vote, would have little effect on any of the five dependent variables ( $H_5$ ). The results for these binomial logistic regressions are reported in Tables 7 to 11. The first hypothesis clearly does not hold. While all five are highly significant statistically at the .0004 level, the combine impact of the eight demographic traits is weak in all of them. For

example, the Psuedo  $R^2$  for Independence is only .09; and the ones for the other four dependent variables are even weaker in the .04 to .06 range.

The results for Independence and Unification strongly support  $H_2$  and  $H_4$ , but provide mixed results for  $H_5$ . Two of the indicators of ethnic identification in Table 7 influence Independence, while socioeconomic or SES has no significant effects, which is in line with  $H_2$ . Mainlander Father has an AOR of 1.99 that is statistically significant at the .011 level; and Min-nan father is marginally significant (.069) with an AOR of .56.  $H_4$  and  $H_5$  also hold for this dependent variable. Younger Taiwanese are much more likely than their elders to advocate Independence (AOR = 2.49; Sig = .0004), while there is no relationship between independence and gender. The results in Table 8 are quite similar for unification with the glaring exception of the fact that gender has a strong impact with men being the most supportive of Unification (AOR = .56 which is significant at the .001 level), thereby disconfirming  $H_5$ . Otherwise, the relationships are quite similar to, but in the opposite direction from those for Independence, in line with  $H_2$  and  $H_4$ . Mainlander Father has a highly significant impact (AOR = 1.99; Sig = .001), while Min-nan father has a marginally significant one; the three SES indicators exercise no independent effects; and Age has the strongest influence in the explanatory



equation with older Taiwanese being the most supportive of unification (AOR = 2.49; Sig = .0004), consistent with H<sub>4</sub>.

**Tables 7 and 8 here**

In sharp contrast, H<sub>5</sub> was the only hypotheses receiving unambiguous support for the three indicators of economic stress and political alienation, as gender has no independent effect on any of these three dependent variables in Tables 9 to 11. The expectation H<sub>3</sub> that the indicators of SES would have a stronger impact than those for ethnic identification only holds for Government Promotes the Public Welfare and is the reverse for Economy Worse, while these two sets of independent variables are approximately equal in their influence on Inequality Bad. Finally, despite younger Taiwanese being hypothesized to have higher levels of economic stress and political alienation (H<sub>4</sub>), the only significant impact of age was on Economy Worse and in the opposite of the predicted direction.

**Tables 9 to 11 here**

Table 9 presents the results for perceptions that Taiwan's economy got worse in 2016. Here, in direct contrast to H<sub>3</sub> and H<sub>4</sub>, none of the SES indicators are associated with the dependent variable; and older Taiwanese are the most likely to see economic decline (AOR = 1.85; Sig = .004). In addition, two of the three ethnic identification items have at least a marginal influence: South (AOR = 1.38; Sig = .008) and Min-nan father (AOR = 1.30;

Sig = .087). In the logistic regression for Inequality Bad in Table 10, there are only two significant independent variables: Education (AOR = .60; Sig = .002) and Min-nan Father (AOR = 1.55; Sig = .005). Consequently, these results are consistent with neither  $H_3$  nor  $H_4$ . Finally, the results for Government Promotes Public Welfare in Table 11 are consistent with  $H_3$  because the SES indicators have a stronger impact than the ethnicity ones but not with  $H_4$  because age is not associated with the dependent variable. The three independent variables that are significant are two indicators of SES and one of ethnic identification: Occupation (AOR = 1.64; Sig = .003), Income (AOR = 1.38; Sig = .01), and South (AOR = .75; Sig = .02).

## **Implications**


This paper has examined the impact of issue voting on Taiwan's 2016 presidential election, in particular the hypothesis that concerns about the economy and malfeasance among the political elites had joined the traditionally dominant cross-Strait relations as influential issues. The hypothesis received strong support from the bivariate correlations of five indicators of the three issues with presidential vote, the multivariate relationships of the issue positions on Tsai Vote in a binomial logistic regression, and even after the demographic characteristics of Taiwan's citizens were controlled. In contrast, using the demographic factors to explain the five issue positions was far less fruitful. Their combined impact was weak; and the results were mixed concerning the predicted relationships.

Taiwan politics may well be entering a period of uncertainty and instability. Analysis of the 2016 elections suggests that the duopoly that the DPP and KMT have enjoyed over the political system may be coming under challenge (Clark, Ho, and Tan, 2016). More recently, despite few signs of revival for the Kuomintang, President Tsai's approval rate had plummeted to 33% after her first year in office (W.H. Chen, 2017). The same thing may be

happening in the realm of issues' role in elections. First, our analysis implies that new issues are becoming more important. Second, while the 2014 and 2016 elections were widely interrupted as representing a rejection of the KMT's approach to cross-Strait relations (Copper, 2014, 2016), Tsai's policies in this area were only approved by 35% of the citizenry (W.H. Chen, 2017; also see Hickey and Niou, 2017). Consequently, the partisan divide over the long-standing central issue in Taiwan may be subject to change as well. It is certainly, "interesting times" for students of Taiwan politics. It remains to be seen, however, whether this will be a blessing or a curse.

**Figure 1**

**Model of Voting Dynamics**



**Variables**

**Presidential Vote**

0=Chu or Soong; 1=Tsai

**Issues**

Taiwan's Ultimate Status

Independence: 0=No; 1=Yes

Unification: 0=No; 1=Yes

Govt Helps Soc Wef: 0=No; 1=Yes

Inequality Very Bad: 0=No; 1=Yes

Tai Econ Worse: 0=No; 1=Yes

**Demographic Characteristics**

Income: 0=Under NT\$ 59,000 a month; 1=Over \$59,000

Occupation: 0=Not White Collar; 1=White Collar

Education: 0=Jr. High or Lower; 1=High School or Higher

Gender: 0=Male; 1=Female

Age: 0=Under 40; 1=Over 40

Area: 0=North & East; 1=South

Taiwanese Father: 0=No; 1=Yes

Mainlander Father: 0=No; 1=Yes

**Table 1**

**Bivariate Association of Party Identification with Tsai Vote\***

<b>Party ID</b>	<b>b</b>	<b>Nagelkerke Pseudo <math>r^2</math></b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Odds Ratio**</b>
Green	5.97	.84	.0004	393.08

**Classification Analysis**

Correct Predictions

Modal Category (Tsai)	63%
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Logistic Regression

Chu/Soong	94%
Tsai	96%
TOTAL	95%

\*Based on binominal logistic regression.

\*\*Unadjusted because there is only one independent variable.

**Table 2**

**Hypothesized Relationships of Predictor Variable to Tsai Vote**

**Independent Variables**

Issue Positions

Independence	Positive
Unification	Negative
Economy Worse	Positive
Inequality Bad	Positive
Govt Helps Public Welfare	Negative

Demographic Characteristics

High Income	Negative
White Collar Education	Negative
Female	Positive
Older	Negative
South	Positive
High Education	Negative
Min-nan Father	Positive
Mainlander Father	Negative

**Table 3**

**Bivariate Association of Issue Position with Tsai Vote\***

<b>Issue Position</b>	<b>b</b>	<b>Nagelkerke Pseudo <math>r^2</math></b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Odds Ratio**</b>
Independence	2.13	.21	.0004	8.45
Unification	-1.41	.07	.0004	.25
Economy Worse	.81	.05	.0004	2.25
Inequality Bad	.78	.05	.0004	2.18
Government Helps Public Welfare	-.99	.07	.0004	.37

\*Based on binominal logistic regression.

\*\*Unadjusted because there is only one independent variable.



**Table 4**

**Crosstab of Tsai Vote with Taiwan's International Status**

<b>Pres. Vote</b>	<b>Taiwan's International Status</b>			
	Unification	Status Quo	Independence	TOTAL
Chu/Soong	67%	47%	11%	38%
Tsai	33%	53%	89%	62%

Gamma = .69

Sig = .0004

**Table 5**

**Binomial Logistic Regression for Issues' Impact on Tsai Vote**

**Dependent Variable: Voted for Tsai**

**Overall Equation**

-2 Log Likelihood	1,200
Chi Square	301
Sig.	.0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.32

Separate Effects of Independent Variables	b	St. Er.	Sig	Adjusted Odds Ratio
Independence	1.93	.19	.0004	6.91
Unification	-.75	.15	.0004	.42
Economy Bad	.76	.15	.0004	2.05
Inequality Bad	.40	.15	.006	1.41
Govt Helps Public Welf	-.75	.15	.0004	.47

**Classification Analysis**

Correct Predictions

Modal Category (Tsai) 63%

Correct Predictions from

Logistic Regression

Chu/Soong	58%
Tsai	81%
TOTAL	72%

**Table 6**

**Binomial Logistic Regression for the Impact of  
Issues and Demographics on Tsai Vote**

**Dependent Variable: Voted for Tsai**

**Overall Equation**

-2 Log Likelihood	988
Chi Square	336
Sig.	.0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.39

Separate Effects of Independent Variables	b	St. Er.	Sig	Adjusted Odds Ratio
Independence	1.79	.21	.0004	6.01
Unification	-.74	.22	.001	.48
Economy Bad	.83	.17	.0004	2.30
Inequality Bad	.35	.17	.035	1.42
Govt Helps Public Welf	-.70	.16	.0004	.50
South	.26	.17	.129	1.29
Min-nan Father	.28	.22	.189	1.33
Mainlander Father	-1.20	.32	.0004	.30
Income	.20	.17	.25	1.22
White Collar Occupation	.10	.18	.57	1.11
Education	-.73	.23	.001	.48
Age	-.59	.19	.001	.56
Female	-.24	.16	.133	.79

**Classification Analysis**

Correct Predictions

Modal Category (Tsai) 63%

Correct Predictions from

Logistic Regression

Chu/Soong	66%
Tsai	82%
TOTAL	76%

Table 7

Logistic Regression for the Impact of Demographic  
Factors on Issue Positions

Dependent Variable: Independence

Overall Equation

-2 Log Likelihood	1,545
Chi Square	82
Sig.	.0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.09

Separate Effects of Independent Variables	b	St. Er.	Sig	Adjusted Odds Ratio
South	.04	.13	.74	1.05
Min-nan Father	.31	.17	.072	1.36
Mainlander Father	-1.00	.30	.001	.37
Income	-.20	.13	.31	.87
White Collar Occupation	.15	.14	.27	.80
Education	-.06	.21	.78	1.17
Age	-.81	.14	.0004	.45
Female	-.02	.13	.87	.98

**Table 8**

**Logistic Regression for the Impact of Demographic  
Factors on Issue Positions**

**Dependent Variable: Unification**

**Overall Equation**

-2 Log Likelihood	986
Chi Square	44
Sig.	.0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.04

Separate Effects of Independent Variables	b	St. Er.	Sig	Adjusted Odds Ratio
South	.04	.13	.113	1.32
Min-nan Father	-.41	.23	.069	.66
Mainlander Father	.69	.27	.011	1.99
Income	.20	.18	.28	1.22
White Collar Occupation	-.22	.18	.23	.80
Education	-.06	.21	.78	.94
Age	.91	.21	.0004	2.49
Female	-.58	.17	.001	.56

**Table 9**

**Logistic Regression for the Impact of Demographic  
Factors on Issue Positions**

**Dependent Variable: Economy Worse**

**Overall Equation**

-2 Log Likelihood	986
Chi Square	44
Sig.	.0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.05

Separate Effects of Independent Variables	b	St. Er.	Sig	Adjusted Odds Ratio
South	.32	.12	.008	1.38
Min-nan Father	.26	.15	.087	1.30
Mainlander Father	-.04	.22	.85	.96
Income	-.10	.12	.42	.90
White Collar Occupation	-.20	.13	.128	.82
Education	-.03	.16	.48	.85
Age	.62	.13	.0004	1.85
Female	-.17	.12	.15	.85

**Table 10**

**Logistic Regression for the Impact of Demographic  
Factors on Issue Positions**

**Dependent Variable: Inequality Bad**

**Overall Equation**

-2 Log Likelihood	1,736
Chi Square	44
Sig.	.0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.04

Separate Effects of Independent Variables	b	St. Er.	Sig	Adjusted Odds Ratio
South	.03	.12	.80	1.03
Min-nan Father	.44	.15	.005	1.55
Mainlander Father	.03	.22	.90	1.03
Income	-.17	.13	.18	.85
White Collar Occupation	-.16	.13	.21	.85
Education	-.51	.17	.002	.60
Age	.16	.13	.20	1.18
Female	.02	.12	.87	1.02

**Table 11**

**Logistic Regression for the Impact of Demographic  
Factors on Issue Positions**

**Dependent Variable: Government Promotes Public Welfare**

**Overall Equation**

-2 Log Likelihood	1,692
Chi Square	62
Sig.	.0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.06

Separate Effects of Independent Variables	b	St. Er.	Sig	Adjusted Odds Ratio
South	-.29	.12	.02	.75
Min-nan Father	.06	.16	.71	1.06
Mainlander Father	.35	.27	.12	1.42
Income	.32	.13	.01	1.38
White Collar Occupation	.50	.13	.0003	1.64
Education	.21	.16	.19	1.24
Age	-.08	.13	.53	.92
Female	-.16	.12	.17	.85



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